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1. Report background 
Project background 
Consumer Action Law Centre (Consumer Action) commissioned Dr Paul 
Harrison, Deakin Business School, Deakin University and Marta Massi, 
School of Marketing and Communication, Lumsa University (Rome), to study 
the psychological aspects of one form of credit marketing - unsolicited credit 
card limit-increase offers (UCCLIOs).
The researchers studied 21 UCCLIO letters – 17 provided by consumers and 
four provided by banks.  They applied theories developed from previous 
research in the fields of marketing, consumer behavior, behavioural 
economics and cognitive psychology, and described likely ways in which 
UCCLIOs influenced consumer behavior and decision making.   
The researchers make some recommendations from a behavioural 
perspective based on their findings, and Consumer Action propose how these 
findings might be applied to consumer policy.
What is an UCCLIO? 
An unsolicited credit card limit-increase offer (UCCLIO) is the offer of a 
specified increase in the credit limit made to a current credit card customer.  
These increases are offered by letters personally addressed to the customer, 
and usually advise that the increased credit limit is “pre-approved”.  Accepting 
the offer is usually a very simple process and in most cases does not require 
the consumer to provide any financial information.1
Consumer advocates and policy makers have been concerned about UCCLIO 
marketing strategies, and the likelihood that they would lead to more 
consumer debt, particularly for low-income and otherwise vulnerable 
consumers.2 However, little is known about the specific mechanisms used in 
UCCLIOs that could lead to such an outcome. 
                                                           
1 The only jurisdiction that does require the provision of financial information by the 
consumer is the ACT. See: Fair Trading Act (ACT) 1992, section 28A.
2 For example, see: Consumer Affairs Victoria, Report of the Consumer Credit Review,
2006, pages 132 – 143.
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The marketing of consumer credit is subject to general requirements in the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA), with a few further requirements (such 
as requirements regarding disclosure) in the Uniform Consumer Credit Code.
The TPA addresses the practice of sending out unsolicited credit (and debit) 
cards.  It is a breach of section 63A of the TPA to send out a credit or debit 
card to a person unless that person has requested it, or unless the card is a 
replacement for a card previously issued, as requested by the cardholder.  
Section 28A of the Fair Trading Act 1992 (ACT) prohibits credit limits being 
increased without the creditor making a full analysis of the consumer’s 
capacity to repay, and thus the ACT is the jurisdiction with the consumer law 
that most strongly regulates UCCLIOs. 
The Banking and Financial Services Ombudsman has also published 
information for bank lenders. The Ombudsman has found that lenders who do 
not appropriately investigate the borrower’s capacity to pay can be liable for 
maladministration3. However, this only results in a remedy for the individual 
consumer who makes a complaint. The Ombudsman states that the way for 
lenders to ensure capacity to repay is to require the borrower to “complete an 
application for new credit as at the date the unsolicited increase was offered.”4
However, this does not appear to have been widely followed. 
Given the relative lack of regulation of UCCLIOs and other forms of credit 
marketing, and the continued concern about the consumer detriment they 
cause, more thought needs to be given to the best policy response. This was 
acknowledged in the Final Report of Consumer Credit Review, published by 
Consumer Affairs Victoria in 2006.5  That report acknowledged the problems 
caused by UCCLIOs and recommended that section 23 of the Fair Trading Act 
1999 (Vic) (the equivalent of section 63A of the Trade Practices Act) be 
amended to apply to UCCLIOs, not just unsolicited (new) credit cards.6 This 
recommendation was supported by the Victorian Government in its response 
to the Consumer Credit Review, but the Government is yet to introduce any 
amendment.
                                                           
3 Banking and Financial Services Ombudsman, Bulletin 45 (March 2005) & Bulletin 50 (June 
2006).
4 Banking and Financial Services Ombudsman, Bulletin 50 (June 2006) page 3.
5 Consumer Affairs Victoria, The Report of the Consumer Credit Review, 2006, p 132-156.
6 The recommendation suggested that credit providers should be permitted to make 
provisional offers to their customers but the customer would have to positively elect the 
credit limit or increased credit limit they require.  Other recommendations related to 
improving information disclosure to consumers, such as detailing the time it would take to 
repay a current and proposed limit if it is fully drawn down.
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Consumer policy in relation to credit marketing needs to be informed by an 
understanding of how marketing influences consumer behaviour in the 
consumer credit context (and, in particular, how marketing influences 
consumer psychology). 
Why study UCCLIOs? 
There is concern in Australia about the rising level of consumer debt, and the 
effect that increased debt has on consumers (particularly low-income 
consumers) and the Australian economy. 
Consumer credit has positive and negative aspects. Credit cards are a 
convenient payment mechanism that can smooth cash-flow and provide a 
cushion of credit. On the other hand, a credit card is an open-ended credit 
facility that some have argued is responsible for a dangerous increase in 
consumer debt levels.7
Indeed, the relationship between debt and poverty in developed countries is 
very strong. While lending and borrowing are important aspects of the modern 
economy, irresponsible lending8 and borrowing can harm consumers, 
particularly low-income consumers.9
UCCLIOs are a relevant example of how marketing credit can lead to an 
increase in debt levels. If, as we argue, the extent (and distribution) of 
consumer debt should be a concern for consumer policy makers, then 
research that improves our understanding of how marketing can lead to 
increased debt is invaluable. If we are to create good regulation or other 
effective interventions, we need to better understand the nature of that which 
we seek to regulate. 
Behavioural economics recognises that consumers may exhibit systematic 
departures from economically rational behavior and helps us understand 
                                                           
7 Mann, Professor Ronald, Charging Ahead: The Growth and Regulation of Payment Card 
Markets, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
8 For further discussion of responsible lending, see: Consumer Action Law Centre, Some views about 
“Responsible Lending”, July 2008. 
http://www.consumeraction.org.au/downloads/RecklesslendingbriefingpaperJuly08.pdf
9 And, based on the recent financial crises emanating from the United States, potentially 
damaging to the national economy.
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consumer decision-making.10 This research into UCCLIOs makes a small 
contribution to the growing body of evidence relevant to consumer and 
competition policy design and implementation, which shows that consumers 
do not always act rationally, and that factors other than the cost and features 
of goods and services influence their decisions.   This calls into question 
policy solutions that rely solely on providing information.  
We argue instead that a policy framework must encompass a range of tools, 
and that their selection should be informed by evidence, including behavioural 
economics, to help consumers make decisions that are in their own interests – 
and the interests of the economy. 
                                                           
10 Ian McAuley, YOU CAN SEE A LOT BY JUST LOOKING: Understanding human judgment in financial decision-
making, Paper to accompany presentation to Australian Bankers’ Association: Broadening financial 
understanding – financial literacy summit, Centre for Policy Development, 2 July 2008. 
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2. Research report 
Introduction 
Credit card debt has become an increasing concern in recent years 
(Copeland, 2000). Media outlets, such as newspapers, television and radio 
(e.g., Jiminez, 2007), cover the topic regularly, and lobby groups seek to 
influence legislation to protect vulnerable groups from over-committing 
themselves. To some degree, using credit to participate in the marketplace 
has become normalised (Christiansen, 2008). However, the idea that these 
transactions are a form of debt is rarely alluded to in credit marketing 
materials.  
Some sociologists argue that credit cards facilitate a culture of “consumerism, 
escalating indebtedness, and increasing homogenisation of the world’s 
cultures (Ritzer, 2001, p. 71)”, while social commentators and consumer 
advocates have argued that the credit card industry needs to be regarded with 
the same critical attitude as  the cigarette industry (Galanoy, 1980). Further, it 
may be argued that consumer credit marketing focuses on the “benefits” 
associated with credit cards rather than the fact that credit involves debt.  
Recent marketing campaigns have portrayed credit cards as, variously, a way 
to earn rewards, a status symbol, and even a fashion statement (Rich, 2007).  
The requirement of credit card lenders, such as banks and finance groups, to 
sell credit as part of their core business, has resulted in a range of marketing 
methods being used to encourage consumers to take up more debt. One of 
these approaches is the use of unsolicited credit card limit-increase offers 
(UCCLIOs), where current cardholders are offered an increase on their card 
limit, in circumstances where the cardholder has not sought, or inquired, about 
an increase. In many cases, these offers claim to be “pre-approved”, and 
there is little, or no, requirement for the cardholder to provide any information 
before the increase is granted.  
UCCLIOs (we understand the industry refers to them as Credit Limit-Increase 
Programs) enable lenders to offer additional credit to particular borrowers.  
Some borrowers receive more offers than others, and only the lender knows 
exactly the types of borrowers being targeted.  UCCLIOs enable lenders to 
encourage an increase in credit card spending and in overall credit card debt 
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(including interest-bearing debt) without the need to attract new customers. In 
addition, some customers receive no, or few, limit-increase offers, while others 
receive regular offers, accepting one after another, gradually increasing their 
credit limit over time. While most borrowers continue to pay at least the 
minimum due each month, consumer agencies report some cases of 
significant hardship arising from these offers. The Banking and Financial 
Services Ombudsman (2005), for example, reports receiving an increasing 
number of disputes “where the disputant claims they were lent money, or 
provided with credit, they could not afford to repay” (p. 2), and that the 
increase in these complaints was “mostly in relation to disputes about credit 
card products” (p. 3).  
There is little doubt that the UCCLIO makes a significant contribution to the 
wider economy. While there are no figures available that identify the 
percentage of outstanding credit card debt that results from UCCLIOs, a 2001 
industry report gives some indication. In arguing that banning UCCLIOs would 
be bad for the economy, the report says that if there was a ban on "pre-
approved" increases, “consumption expenditure in the Australian economy 
could be reduced by around $30 billion per annum - more than the annual 
turnover of Coles Myer” (Nolan Norton Institute 2001, p. 8).  
Background
It is now generally accepted in psychology, economics, and marketing, that 
human behaviour depends upon the environment in which choices are made. 
For example, psychological experiments have found that people will be 
influenced by the ways in which an option is framed. This includes the amount 
of information that they are asked to process, and how far into the future the 
costs and benefits of the choice are accrued (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). 
Similarly, it is also now accepted that people do not objectively interpret 
events (Shafir, 2007).  
However, consumer policy around credit in particular, rarely takes into account 
this model, preferring to adhere to a purely rational, self-interested 
interpretation of human behaviour. The major policy concession tends to be a 
requirement for information disclosure, i.e., providing the consumer with more 
(and often detailed) information about financial products. In light of our 
understanding of the “irrationality” of human behaviour, it is surprising that 
there has been little research into how psychological manipulations might 
affect consumers’ decisions to take up credit. In particular, the recent growth 
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of the UCCLIO as a marketing mix component has meant that there is no 
research that examines this particular form of credit promotion, and how it 
might influence consumer attitudes and response. This report makes an initial 
attempt to address this neglect, and uses elements of psychological theory 
and previous research into credit to explore how consumers might respond to 
the UCCLIO. 
Bertrand et al. (2005) found that the use of psychological manipulations 
significantly affected consumers’ decisions to take up short-term loans. They 
found that offer letters displaying a small interest rate and monthly repayment 
table generated a higher take-up rate than offer letters displaying a large table 
and detailed information about repayment. In other words, consumers were 
more likely to take-up a loan if the description of the offer was minimal, rather 
than if many examples, plain language, or detailed information about the 
terms of the loan were provided. In another manipulation, the research found 
that male customers’ take-up increased with the inclusion of a woman’s photo 
in the corner of the offer letter. On average, any one positive significant 
feature increased take-up at the same level of one half-percentage point drop 
in the monthly interest rate. 
Research has also been conducted into attitudes toward credit cards amongst 
college students (e.g., Warwick and Mansfield, 2000; Norvilitis et al., 2003; 
Norvilitis et al., 2006). Norvilitis et al. (2006) found that the students’ age, a 
lack of financial knowledge, number of credit cards, and attitude toward 
delaying payment, all contributed to credit card debt. A study of 381 students 
found that they knew little about the details of their credit card agreement 
(Warwick and Mansfield, 2000). In this study, only a small number of students 
were able to report their current interest rate, although most were able to 
estimate their current outstanding balance. Further, those who overestimated 
their future income were more likely to be in debt (Seaward and Kemp, 2000). 
Tolerant attitudes toward debt have been found to increase after students 
become indebted (Davis and Lea, 1995), and those consumers with credit 
cards tended to spend less time and more money when making purchases 
using their credit cards, than when using cash (Feinberg, 1986).  
It is also arguable that credit seems more psychologically distant from the 
transactional experience than cash (Simmel, 1978), and that this distance is 
less concrete, and therefore, requires more cognitive resources to form a 
defensive attitude, and assume conscious self-control, against positive 
psychological manipulations based on positive and simple messages 
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(Baumeister, 2002). Similarly, by using a credit card much of our transacting 
does not require face-to-face interaction, and therefore, the social norms 
around attitudes toward greed and materialism are more easily overcome and 
the physical (and therefore psychological) experience of handing over cash is 
removed (Ritzer, 2001).  
Amongst the general public, it has been found that a favourable general 
attitude toward using credit has a positive effect on predicting the amount of 
credit, as well as correlating with the size of the credit card debt (Chien and 
Devaney, 2001). Similarly, Sullivan et al. (2000) found that consumers 
approached installment loans with more caution and more involvement, than 
when using a credit card. In summary, these studies suggest that those who 
acquire credit and go into debt may not fully understand the implications of 
their financial behaviour. 
Unsolicited credit card limit-increase offers 
The recent emergence of the UCCLIO as a marketing tool has been a further 
concern for consumer advocates11. It is arguable that the UCCLIO is a 
combination of a sales tool and a promotion, and therefore its analysis needs 
to consider psychological factors around both these elements of the marketing 
mix. Further, the UCCLIO letter is more than a means of communicating 
information; it reduces the potential level of cognitive engagement with the 
issue because it requires little effort beyond a decision to agree or disagree 
with the offer.
In contrast, completing a credit card application requires the consumer to 
participate in a range of cognitive activities, including determining the amount 
of credit required, the completion of personal details, such as name, address, 
phone number and date of birth, the process of calculation of income and 
expenditure, and often, the collation and verification of materials such as pay 
slips, and forms of identification. Clearly, the UCCLIO is a “low-involvement” 
means of gaining additional credit. 
                                                           
11 Submission to James Merlino MP, Member for Monulk, Report of the Consumer Credit 
Review, Prepared by Consumer Credit Legal Service (Vic) and Consumer Law Centre 
Victoria April 2006 
See
<http://www.consumer.vic.gov.au/ca256902000fe154/lookup/cav_credit_review_submission
s3/$file/14cclsandclcvcrreportsubmission.pdf>
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The obligation to disclose information to consumers is at the core of consumer 
regulation, based on the belief that it “enhances consumers’ ability to assess 
financial products and make informed decisions (Australian Treasury 1999).”  
The key consumer protection provisions in Australia that relate to advertising 
and marketing are the prohibitions on misleading and deceptive conduct under 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (also mirrored in various State legislation) and 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001.  These laws 
prohibit “conduct that is misleading or deceptive, or is likely to mislead or 
deceive”. Case law suggests that Courts can take into account whether a 
particular class of consumers, were likely to be mislead or deceived by the 
conduct.
Advertising of some products is banned (e.g., tobacco products) or restricted 
(e.g., gambling). Such restrictions are based on concerns that advertising can 
increase the number of consumers who buy products that are or may be 
harmful.  However, there are very limited restrictions on credit advertising and 
promotion, and these restrictions generally relate to the disclosure of the 
interest rate in certain circumstances (Part 9, Consumer Credit Code). 
Further, elements of psychology and behavioural economics have not been 
considered in legislation around consumer policy, predominantly because 
policy makers believe that “much policy is already based on, or implicitly 
accounts for, behavioural economic tenets” (Australian Government, 2007, p. 
309). At present, no research exists, as far as we are aware, into the UCCLIO, 
and how the content, layout, and imagery, of this form of marketing influences 
consumer decision-making. Indeed, it is suggested that consumer attitudes 
have gradually shifted from caution to an attitude of entitlement - “I thought the 
credit card was my money (ANZ Bank 2005, p.26)”. We suggest that in this 
context, then, this type of research is needed if marketers and legislative 
bodies are truly concerned about the growing problem of debt amongst 
vulnerable consumers.
Research framework and methodology 
The researchers examined 17 unsolicited credit card limit-increase offers that 
had been sent to customers, usually in the form of a promotional letter, and a 
completion form. The researchers also invited banks and credit providers to 
provide them with examples of UCCLIOs. One bank responded, providing four 
different offers, bringing the total number of UCCLIOs examined for this 
research to 21.  
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For the purposes of this research, each UCCLIO was required to include the 
following elements: 
• It must be a credit card limit-increase offer (as opposed to some other 
special offer, such as a balance transfer); 
• The target customer must already be a bank customer; 
• It does not require the customer to provide additional income details, 
i.e., the credit has been pre-approved, and, 
• The application is apparently not subject to a credit assessment e.g., 
provision of income details, or the submission of a pay-slip. 
Analysis was conducted at two levels, 1. An analysis of the language used in 
the UCCLIO, and 2. A content analysis using analytic induction. The 
researchers scanned each of the UCCLIOs into Adobe Acrobat 7.0, and 
converted each document into a word document via optical character 
recognition (OCR) software. The conversions were then checked for accuracy 
with the original letter. Where images and colours where used, these were 
also noted and coded for analysis. In relation to the text, the documents were 
then input into Leximancer software, an analytical tool that allows the 
researcher to identify key themes, concepts and ideas from unstructured text. 
Leximancer uses an internal thesaurus that learns concepts, and creates links 
between related concepts in the text for analysis. 
Using this tool, the researchers examined the use of terms that could be 
considered to be a positive or desirable attribute of a particular product. For 
example, the word “choice” is intuitively perceived by most to be a positive 
attribute, whereas the word “debt” is most often perceived as a negative 
attribute. The attribution of each word, and whether it represented a positive or 
negative meaning was then examined independently by the Chief Investigator 
and the Research Associate. The images and colours were also noted in 
terms of the key themes that they were portraying. 
In addition, a content analysis was conducted that took into account 
psychological manipulations around a number of relevant theories (including 
framing, prospect theory, scarcity, trust, branding, maintaining the status quo, 
the use of heuristics, expert opinion, and bias) by analytic induction. This 
allows the researcher to be both grounded to established theory, and also to 
develop theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). In essence, analytic induction is a 
means of “inducing laws from a deep analysis of experimentally isolated 
instances” (Znaniecki 1934, p. 237). Analytic induction involves a form of 
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reasoning that aims to make universal statements that ultimately reflect fairly 
exhaustive knowledge of what is researched. Analytic induction explains a 
phenomenon which may be supplemented by other quantitative data to 
provide a fuller understanding.
Again, each of the UCCLIOs was examined independently by each of the 
researchers. Notes were compared between both researchers, and apparent 
agreements and any disagreements were discussed amongst the research 
team. This approach for analysis of secondary materials through isolated 
analysis, followed by team comparison, is derived from a number of qualitative 
analytical methods, including techniques such as convergent interviewing, and 
the long interview. 
The next section of this report includes the findings from the analysis of the 
language and its relationships, used in the UCCLIO offer letters. The 
predominant analytical method was the Leximancer software, focusing 
particularly on language and its relationships. A more detailed discussion 
regarding language usage in UCCLIOs is addressed later in this report. 
In all the UCCLIOs that were examined for this research, the use of the word 
“debt” (that may work to provide a psychological barrier) was referred to only 
twice, (although these were slightly different versions of the same offer by the 
same lender).  The word was used  in the “important information” page – 
provided as a separate page in one case and on the reverse of the offer in the 
other.  This UCCLIO was one of those provided by the banks, rather than by 
consumers.  
There was substantial use of positive statements highlighting the benefits of 
increasing the credit limit, such as: 
“Get a little more out of everyday with a credit limit increase” 
“You never know when you might need a credit limit increase” 
“Would you like a credit limit increase?” 
“In recognition of your excellent repayment history, we’re pleased to 
invite you to take advantage of a $3,000 increase on your ANZ First Free 
Days Visa card” 
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“As a valued BankWest customer and in recognition of your excellent 
repayment record, you are invited to increase the credit limit on your 
BankWest Zero MasterCard. Even if you don't need the money straight 
away, it is reassuring to know it’s there if you need it, plus you are pre- 
approved and there is no charge for increasing your limit” 
“If you would like to increase your credit limit, you have qualified for the 
following increase” 
The word “increase” appeared in all the UCCLIOs sent to consumers. All 
these statements were in bold or colour (with gold and blue being the most 
prominent), and in larger font (greater than 16pt) than the main text of the 
offer. In an individualist and rational society, the word “increase” is most often 
used in a positive context, as it connotes success, achievement, and 
augmentation. The psychology of how a consumer might interpret these 
statements is discussed in more detail further in this report. 
The use of bolding, and larger fonts was found in 40 per cent of the offers. For 
example, one offer provided by a bank, had the following statements in bold, 
and in a larger font (18 pt) than the rest of the letter,  
“You’re pre-approved for an increased limit on your Visa Card”, and,  
“pre-approved acceptance” 
On this same UCCLIO, directly underneath the latter statement, in half the font 
size (8pt), was the statement,  
“I confirm that if I utilise the new credit limit that is available on my card, I 
can repay my increased minimum monthly payment of $(new amount) as 
required by [name of lender]’s Credit Cards Terms and Conditions, 
without substantial hardship.”
Similarly, on the next page of this offer is what the bank refers to as “Important 
Information”. However, this is all in small font (10pt), and the headings are in 
light orange, which is difficult to read. On another offer, in 20pt font, are the 
words, “You deserve the privileges of gold”. Other bolded text messages in 
this offer are “Enjoy gold class travel benefits”, and “Take advantage of this 
golden opportunity”. The use of colour in many of the UCCLIOs was observed. 
For example, one offer had an orange highlighter style circle and arrows (that 
- 15 - 
was designed to look hand drawn) leading the eye from the customer’s name, 
to the new, pre-approved credit limit, to the signature line (we have been 
advised by the issuing bank that this letter is no longer being used).  
Of the 21 UCCLIOs examined, five provided customer information that would 
alert the customer to the issues around accepting the increase. In most cases, 
these were on an additional page, and in smaller font than the smallest text on 
the offer page. On one warning letter, the opening paragraph stated, 
Have you really thought about your credit card?  
Your credit card offers you great flexibility. Flexibility in making 
purchases. Flexibility in making repayments. Flexibility in managing your 
debt. But it’s important to remember, like any debt, you will have to repay 
it.
Clearly, the focus of this “warning” is on flexibility, which is repeated four 
times, rather than debt. The consistent use of the term flexibility also 
reinforces the positive heuristic. 
Some banks did provide information about how customers might voluntarily 
reduce the amount of the increase offer (12 out of 21), while others provided 
specific information about the minimum repayment that a customer might be 
expected to repay per month (three out of 21). Similarly, many of the offers did 
provide information, usually at the end of the offer letter, that asked the 
customer to consider their financial circumstances before accepting (seven 
out of 21). However, as explained in the next section of this report, these 
“warnings”, or “important information” sections are likely to be ignored, 
missed, or overlooked, in the context of the rest of the UCCLIO letter, and the 
psychological manipulations contained within.  
The next section of this report examines the UCCLIOs in light of our 
understanding of potential psychological manipulations within the letters sent 
to customers. Each theoretical proposition is examined by using examples 
from a number of UCCLIOs, and explaining how consumers’ attitudes and 
decisions may be exploited by elements of the UCCLIO. Further, we 
summarise previous experiments by other researchers in each of these areas 
to demonstrate how their work complements our analysis of the UCCLIOs. 
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In this context, it was found that UCCLIOs use at least six different forms of 
psychological manipulations to promote and sell an increase in credit amongst 
their customers. These manipulations are: 
1. The format of the UCCLIO leads to low-involvement, trust, and the use 
of the peripheral route to understanding. 
2. Expertise increases trust, in that the UCCLIOs take the shape of letters 
signed by managers and directors of the banks i.e., financial experts. In 
the letters, customers are reassured that they can afford the credit 
increase by a credible source i.e., an expert. 
3. Consumers of financial products are likely to use heuristic processing, 
rather than systematic processing when considering a credit limit-
increase offer. 
4. The use of the statement, “Pre-approved” implies psychological 
ownership, and property rights. In addition, consumers who have been 
told that they have pre-approval will then assume that this is the “status 
quo”, resulting in a psychological barrier to reject the status quo. 
5. UCCLIOs are “loss-framed”, in that the letter is structured in a way that 
suggests the offer is something special whose missed acceptance 
would be a loss to them. Evidence from behavioural economics 
suggests that losses are felt greater than gains, and individuals will 
seek to avoid loss, more than to seek gains. 
6. Financial institutions use scarcity in the format of the UCCLIO to 
increase perceived consumer utility and desire for the credit increase. 
Each of these propositions is now examined in more detail. Within each 
proposition, we provide a number of examples to illustrate how this 
manipulation is manifested in the UCCLIO letter. 
1. The format and layout of the UCCLIO leads to low-involvement, 
trust and the use of the peripheral route to understanding. 
Receiving and considering a UCCLIO can be considered a low- involvement 
activity. Consumer research suggests that customers tend to take a limited 
interest in financial services and consider them as a necessity (Aldlanigan and 
Buttle, 2001; Beckett et al., 2000). In general, research suggests that most 
consumers do not spend much time thinking about their finances. Thus, 
traditional consumer behaviour models based upon the sequence, 
“information - attitude – purchase” (Nicosia, 1966; Engel et al., 1968; Howard 
and Sheth, 1969; Bettman, 1979) are limited in relation to financial services 
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(Beckett et al., 2000). It is arguable, then, that a rational and methodical 
search for information does not shape and direct rational choice in the 
financial context, but other exogenous factors influence the consumer's 
disposition to purchase financial products.  
Moreover, financial services and products intrinsically require purchases on a 
recurring base (Turnbull and Gibbs, 1987), and therefore, most financial 
service consumption is done habitually, rather than on a high-involvement 
basis. Most consumers do not engage at any substantial level about how their 
bank or financial institution is managing their finances on an ongoing basis.  
They will, invariably, assume that they can trust their bank or financial 
institution to behave, first and foremost, legally, ethically, and responsibly., 
Consumers will also assume that the bank will act, as much as possible in 
their interests, as a customer, and as a citizen. Indeed, this trust is a good 
thing, in that banks ask their customers to trust them to manage their finances 
in a responsible and professional manner, and customers “hand over” their 
finances in good faith.  
The format and layout of many UCCLIOs reinforces and encourages the 
customer to maintain their level of low-involvement and trust of the issuing 
party in the decision process. In Figures 4.1, 5.1, 2.1, and 3.1, for example, 
the letter emphasises that the process of applying for the credit increase is 
simple, straightforward, and requires little effort or practical comprehension on 
the part of the customer. Figure 4.3 says, “All you have to do is sign the 
coupon… and mail it back using the reply paid envelope”, while Figure 5.1 
reinforces that the process is simple, and, importantly, has no immediate costs 
(i.e., free), through the statements, “Simply call or complete the acceptance 
form” and “Return it to us free in the reply-paid envelope”. Similarly, Figure 2.1 
emphasises the simplicity of the process through the use of text bolding, “It’s 
easy to make the change” and through the reiteration of the ease of 
completion, “It’s easy”, “Simply sign”, and “It’s that simple”, while Figure 3.1 
states “All you have to do is sign”. Similarly, in Figures 3.2, 4.4, 1.2, and 4.5, 
the customer’s role is secondary, because the process is simplified to the 
point where the customer merely has to sign the form and return it, usually in 
a reply-paid envelope. UCCLIOs are decidedly different from new credit card 
applications and other types of loans, which require significant cognitive and 
physical effort to complete.
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It is clear, then, that trust and loyalty are determining factors in influencing 
choices concerning financial services and products. In addition, “the 
establishment of trust can also bring about a degree of inertia in buyer-seller 
relationships” (McKechnie, 1992, p.5). Thus, if we assume that trust is not 
“taking a risk per se, but rather it is a willingness to take risk” (Mayer et al., 
1995, p. 712), it can be argued that consumers, who feel a degree of 
confidence in trusting banks and financial providers and their offers, are more 
willing to take “risks”, and will follow the peripheral, rather than the central 
route to persuasion. Furthermore, in this context consumers will process 
information heuristically rather than systematically, i.e., use cognitive 
shortcuts, (Chaiken, 1984), when analysing their offers.  
According to Petty and Cacioppo (1981, 1986) there are two distinct routes to 
persuasion: a central route, occurring when the person is motivated and able 
to engage in effortful cognitive activity and to think about the issue, and a 
peripheral route that “occurs when either motivation, experience, skills, or 
ability is low” (Cialdini et al., 1981, p.365). “The central route emphasises a 
thoughtful consideration of the attitude issue, whereas the peripheral route 
emphasises aspects of the persuasion situation that are clearly tangential to 
the issue under consideration e.g., the attractiveness of the message’s 
source” (Cialdini et al. 1981, p. 365).
In Figure 4.1, for example, the customer is invited to continue their trust in the 
organisation; since she is a loyal and reliable customer, “with a proven credit 
history”. Similarly in Figure 3.2, the customer’s trust in the bank is reinforced 
through the letter’s pronouncement that they are “a valued NAB customer”. In 
all cases, the customer is therefore likely to use heuristics and the peripheral 
route in agreeing (rather than choosing) to increase their credit card limit. 
Similarly, the concept of the “central vs peripheral route” can be also 
described as systematic vs heuristic processing (Chaiken, 1984). According to 
Chaiken (1984) systematic processing is “a comprehensive analytical 
orientation in which perceivers access and scrutinise all informational input for 
its relevance and importance to their judgement task”. However, the heuristic 
paradigm (Chaiken, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984; Chaiken and Eagly, 1983; Eagly 
and Chaiken, 1984), is a limited processing mode that demands much less 
cognitive effort, involvement, and capacity than systematic processing.  
Most authors agree that the essential characteristic of involvement is the 
perceived personal relevance (e.g., Petty and Cacioppo, 1981; Richins and 
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Bloch, 1986; Zaichkowsky, 1985). That is, a consumer's level of involvement 
with an object, situation, or action is determined by the degree to which he 
perceives that concept to be personally relevant. According to Celsi and 
Olson, (1988, p. 211) the focus of cognitive processing is directed by what 
they call “felt involvement”, i.e., a motivational state that affects “the 
interpreted meanings produced by attention and comprehension processes”. 
Thus, motivation to process information is a function of the perception of 
personally relevant knowledge that is activated in memory in a particular 
situation. 
In particular, according to research by Aldlanigan and Buttle (2001) in relation 
to personal involvement in financial services, and based upon the 
aforementioned involvement models (Laurent and Kapferer, 1985; 
Zaichkowsky, 1985), personal loans, such as a credit card, are labelled as 
medium-involvement services. As discussed earlier, it is arguable that the 
nature of UCCLIO, requiring even less cognitive effort than a personal loan or 
an actual application for a credit card, would result in even less psychological 
involvement, than the context investigated by Aldlanigan and Buttle (2001). 
Furthermore, results suggested that three dimensions of involvement, viz., 
sign value, pleasure (Laurent and Kapferer, 1985), and interest (Zaichkowsky, 
1985) are not relevant in the context of financial services.  
Furthermore, Beckett et al. (2000) developed a matrix, based on the work of 
Dwyer et al. (1987) and Thibaut and Kelly (1959), comparing consumer 
confidence (low/high) with involvement (low/high). According to the authors, 
the consumer's disposition to purchase financial products is influenced by 
exogenous (external) and institutional factors i.e., factors relating to “the 
importance of trust and loyalty and to the degrees and modes of consumer 
participation”. Thus they suggest that the purchase process is not linear  
(information - attitude – purchase) based on the search of information by the 
individual (Nicosia, 1966; Engel et al., 1968; Howard and Sheth, 1969; 
Bettman, 1979), but that the context in which this information is processed  
must be considered and it should be assumed that often individuals are not 
able to process information (Bettman, 1979).  
Beckett et al. (2000, p. 17) suggest that calculating costs and benefits is 
difficult for a consumer of financial services and “it is because of this inability 
that they create relationships”. Furthermore their “interest or involvement in 
these services is limited, but they still remain a necessity”. Therefore, 
consumers have traditionally used repeat passive behavior to structure their 
- 20 - 
purchases of simple financial services, especially “transactions” and, to some 
extent, “deposits and loans” (Beckett et al., 2000). Doney and Canon (1997) 
demonstrated that when consumers find it difficult to make rational choices 
based on available information they tend to create relationships and to 
emphasise trust and loyalty. Moreover they are more likely to do cross-
purchases from a single supplier, because they trust the single supplier, rather 
than looking for alternatives. 
Thus it is arguable that financial products, particularly UCCLIOs, are low-
involvement activities that do not require systematic processing. Factors such 
as trust and heuristic cues (the expert and the brand heuristics) make 
customers more likely to take a risk in relation to the UCCLIO, showing inertia 
in their relationship with the bank or financial institutions. 
2. Expertise implies trust 
The UCCLIO’s take the shape of letters signed by managers and directors of 
the banks or credit providers, i.e., financial experts. In the letters, customers 
are reassured implicitly that they can afford the credit increase by the 
imprimatur of a credible source, i.e., an expert who is familiar with their 
financial situation. Experts function as guarantees of the customer’s ability to 
manage the credit increase and to repay the “debt”. It is of fundamental 
importance in this context for current customers of the bank or financial 
institution to know that the offer comes from an expert source, because, in the 
absence of other significant elements, people use the expert heuristic to make 
a judgement (Chaiken, 1984; Petty and Cacioppo, 1984). The UCCLIO 
promotional letter is also often presented in a format that suggests that the 
expert is offering this increase as a reward for previous good behaviour. 
Consumers are likely to assume that experts have analysed their financial 
situation, have checked their capability to manage the increase, and through 
the offer letter – which is a physical manifestation of the institution’s 
acceptance of these factors – have decided to approve the increase. Each of 
these steps provides prima facie evidence to the consumer, that an expert 
whom they can trust believes that they should accept the credit increase offer. 
For example, Figure 5.1 uses bold text to highlight that the source of the letter 
is the Head of Cards, and implies that you can trust this source. Everything in 
the UCCLIO letter aims to reassure consumers that a credible and trustable 
source is offering them the opportunity to obtain a credit increase.  
- 21 - 
According to Chaiken (1984), people may have learned or been taught that 
statements by experts are usually more “truthful” than statements by people 
who lack expertise. For example, heuristic processing would lead people to 
expect messages to contain more valid arguments when they come from 
expert rather than non-expert sources, and to expect attitude objects or 
attitudinal positions to be more worthy when they are endorsed by many 
rather than few people. Thus, “if a message is delivered by an expert, its 
arguments may be perceived as stronger and elaborated on more positively 
than if the message is delivered by a non-expert” (Chaiken and Maheswaran, 
1994, p.461). The importance of the credibility of the source has been proved 
by several experiments: 
a) Ratneshwar and Chaiken (1991) demonstrated that comprehensibility 
influences the persuasive impact of source expertise: when 
comprehension of the message is low, subjects rely on the expertise in 
forming their attitudes, but when comprehension and, hence, systematic 
processing is higher, source expertise has no impact on subjects' 
attitudes. The researchers conducted two studies providing subjects with 
information about a novel product that was attributed to either an expert 
or inexpert inventor.  In Study 1, comprehensibility of the product 
information was manipulated by altering information exposure time (an 
opportunity-related variable), while in Study 2, the same was achieved by 
varying the availability of relevant prior knowledge (an ability-related 
variable). Subjects who participated in study 1 (141 male and female 
undergraduates) were informed that they would provide reactions to one 
of eight "new inventions and products" filed with the U.S. Patent Office, 
and were given a three-page booklet. The first paragraph in the booklet 
informed all subjects that a picture and description of a new product had 
been "reproduced from U.S. Patent No. 4,348,545 and conformed to the 
standard Patent Office format, as specified in Patents and Inventions: An
Information Guide”.  
In Paragraph 2 of the booklet, two different identities of the patent owner 
(John D. Harris) were given: “subjects in the high-expertise conditions 
were informed that Harris was a professor of industrial design at Stanford 
University and that he had numerous patents to his credit as well as a 
published book on creativity and product design; whereas, subjects in the 
low-expertise conditions were told that Harris was a realtor, that he held 
no other patents, and that he had been trying without success to date to 
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find a publisher for a book he wanted to write on creativity and product 
design”. Finally in the last page they found the product information.   
In study 2, in which 131 male and female undergraduates participated, 
the source expertise was manipulated in a manner identical to that of 
Study 1, but three levels of comprehensibility were created. Only the 
subjects in the high and medium-comprehensibility conditions were 
shown a picture of the product projected onto a screen for 10 seconds. 
According to results, “the expert (vs. inexpert) inventor engendered more 
positive attitudes among subjects who had relatively poor comprehension 
of the product information, but not among subjects whose comprehension 
levels were high. In addition, low- (vs. high-) comprehensibility subjects 
listed more source-related thoughts, but fewer product information related 
thoughts, and their attitudes were more strongly associated with their 
perceptions of source expertise and their valenced source-related 
thoughts” (p.56). 
b) Chaiken and Maheswaran (1994) conducted another experiment 
involving 367 New York University undergraduates who were asked to 
read a four-page booklet about a new telephone answering machine, the 
"XT-100." The booklet conveyed the task importance, source credibility, 
and message-type manipulations. In particular, page two of the booklet 
described the source of the “product description”. In the high-credibility 
condition, subjects were told that the description was an excerpt from an 
authoritative source, the Consumer Reports, a magazine specialising in 
the scientific testing of new products, whereas in the low-credibility 
condition, subjects were told that the description was an excerpt from a 
promotional pamphlet prepared by the sales staff of Kmart, a discount 
retail chain.  According to results, the valence of subjects’ source-related 
thoughts was more positive in the higher rather than the lower-credibility 
conditions.  In addition, source-related thinking grew more positive as 
message type changed from unambiguous weak to ambiguous to 
unambiguous strong. Results demonstrated that “source credibility 
affected persuasion partly through its impact on the valence of systematic 
processing, confirming that heuristic processing can bias systematic 
processing when evidence is ambiguous” (Chaiken and Maheswaran, 
1994, p. 460). 
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c) Tiedens and Linton (2001) gave 165 students (77 women and 88 men) 
a short essay to read and asked questions about their attitudes on the 
essay topic. In the essay, “the author asserted that there was too much 
grade inflation and that to combat this trend, students in college classes 
should be graded more harshly”. Specifically, the author argued that the 
grades should be normally distributed, with the mean grade being a C”  
(p. 977). All the students read the same essay, but the source was 
described differently. Half of the participants (n = 83) were given the 
student version of this essay where the author was presented as a 
student and the essay was formatted as a typical college paper (on 
regular printer paper, double spaced, centered title, etc.). The other half 
of the participants (n = 82) received the expert version. In this version, 
the author was presented as a distinguished professor of education, and 
the essay was formatted to look like a copy of a newspaper editorial (i.e., 
in column format, justified, etc.).
According to the results, “compared with emotions associated with 
uncertainty, emotions associated with certainty [from those who read the 
“expert” essay] resulted in greater reliance on the expertise of a source of 
a persuasive message” (Tiedens and Linton, 2001, p. 973). In this 
experiment, when induced to feel certainty-related emotions, “participants 
were more likely to rely on the expertise of the source”, than when 
induced to feel uncertainty-related emotions. According to the 
researchers, “this is a sign that people experiencing certainty emotions 
processed more heuristically: they based their judgments on superficial 
cues in the environment” (Tiedens and Linton, 2001, p. 978).
One of the central issues of concern in the marketing of unsolicited card offers 
are those described as “pre-approved”. As the pre-approved form comes from 
a trustable source, such as a bank, this will have a strong influence on 
consumer perception. All the UCCLIOs examined in this research are signed 
by a person in a position of authority, i.e., an expert, such as a General 
Manager, Retail Sales & Service (Figures 2.1 and 2.2), General Manager, 
Consumer and Commercial Cards (Figures 3.1 and 3.2), Managing Director, 
Card Solutions (Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4). The terminology used to 
describe the role of the letter author will also feed perceptions of 
trustworthiness – a General Manager will have a level of authority that 
suggests to the current customer that they can, 1. Trust the source, and 2. 
Assume the source understands the financial situation of the customer. In 
conjunction with other factors, such as brand heuristics, and the likelihood of 
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low involvement, these manipulations strongly affect perception, and ultimate 
decision-making. This is because “people are aware that experts are often 
right, and so they might choose to use the expertise cue, rather than the 
actual content of the message, for their judgment” (Shah and Oppenheimer 
2008, p.213).
3. Systematic vs Heuristic processing 
It is generally assumed that people analyse and process the information 
according to a rational and systematic paradigm (Chaiken, 1980), and 
therefore, consumers will make the “right” choice, i.e., the choice that provides 
the consumer with the best utility. This approach tends to inform much of 
government policy and industry procedures around credit marketing, including 
the marketing of UCCLIOs. According to Chaiken (1984), systematic 
processing is “a comprehensive analytical orientation in which perceivers 
access and scrutinise all informational input for its relevance and importance 
to their judgement task”. Systematic processing, however, has been shown to 
require more than marginal level of effort and cognitive capacity. People must 
be highly motivated to process systematically - which is rarely the case – and 
this mode is affected by situational variables and individual differences that 
constrain an individual’s capacities for in-depth information processing (e.g., 
time pressures, lack of domain-specific expertise, difficulties with language). In 
the context of UCCLIOs, then, it is arguable that the consumers who are most 
susceptible to these marketing strategies are those with less understanding, 
ease or familiarity with credit. This is not to argue that those with higher levels 
of financial literacy may not be influenced, however, those with less 
understanding are more likely to revert to use of heuristics.   
According to Chaiken et al. (1989), this processing can be biased depending 
upon motivational factors, (such as how motivated the individual is to 
understand the information), and cognitive factors, (such as the perceivers’ 
knowledge and confidence in comprehending the issue under consideration). 
Thus, people will often use a different kind of processing, referred to as the 
heuristic paradigm (Chaiken, 1978, 1980, 1982; Chaiken and Eagly 1983; 
Eagly and Chaiken 1984), which is a “limited processing mode that demands 
much less cognitive effort and capacity than systematic processing”. In fact, 
people will tend to focus on the subset of available information that enables 
them to use simple inferential rules schemata or cognitive heuristics to 
formulate their judgment and decisions (Chaiken and al., 1989; Eagly and 
Chaiken, 1993). Indeed, “the primary processing goal of message recipients is 
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to assess the validity of the persuasive message they encounter” (Chaiken, 
1989, p.214), and both heuristic and systematic processing serve this 
objective (Chaiken, 1982). 
The rules of heuristics that define heuristic processing are learned knowledge 
structures, “simple schemas or decision rules (cognitive heuristics)” (Chaiken, 
1984, p. 4) that may be used either consciously or unconsciously by 
perceivers and that people have presumably learnt based on past experiences 
and observation (Nisbett and Ross, 1980). According to the heuristic model 
(Chaiken, 1984, p. 3), “people exert little cognitive effort in judging the validity 
of a persuasive message and may base their agreement with a message on 
the basis of a superficial assessment of a variety of extrinsic persuasion cues 
such as surface or structural characteristic of the message itself (e. g., its 
length or the numbers of arguments) or communicator characteristics (e.g., 
expertise, likeability)”. Figure 5.1 uses heuristic processing at a number of 
levels. Many of the elements in this UCCLIO are manipulated to capture 
customers’ visual attention, for example, the brand is represented by a large 
logo (this also incorporates the brand heuristic), and the use of bold text, such 
as “pre-approved”, and “credit-limit increase”, are also used as heuristics, or 
decision-making shortcuts. Similarly, Figure 1.1 uses visual heuristics such as 
the blue colour of the brand logo. Heuristic processing occurs when a person 
has less capacity or motivation to do well in a task or is less involved in the 
task (Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken, 1997), as is the case for most consumers in 
relation to financial products. 
The brand name heuristic explains why people evaluate products with 
positively valenced brand names more favourably. Maheswaran, Mackie, and 
Chaiken (1992), for example, found that “both consumers' level of motivation, 
and the extent to which brand-name based expectations are confirmed by 
subsequent processing of attribute information moderate brand-name 
utilization” (p. 317). In Figure 4.4, for example, a customer’s visual attention is 
captured by images emphasising three key words, viz., “Reductions. 
Stocktake. Sale”, the picture of the credit card with the main brand 
(Mastercard), and the sub-brand (which is also a retailer), Coles-Myer Source, 
in order to obtain the brand heuristic. Similarly, in Figure 4.1, elements of the 
text stimulate the heuristic processing, e.g., the bolded text, “Get a little more 
out of every day with a credit increase”, which anticipates the offer contained 
within the letter. 
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In Figure 2.2, however, the Commonwealth Bank uses heuristics to make the 
customer aware of the risks connected to accepting the offer. The words “Not 
accept” and “Smaller Credit” are emphasised with the bolded text and are 
visual shortcuts for the customer. 
According to the heuristic model, people may apply such rules in judging the 
probable validity of persuasive communications when they are “unmotivated 
and unable to process systematically” (Chaiken, 1984, p.8). When the 
recipient lacks either the motivation or the ability to think carefully about a 
persuasive message (e.g., because of time pressure, distraction, or message 
content that the target considers personally irrelevant), the target will seek 
cues in the message or situation (e.g., the presence of consensus information, 
the brand name, the expertise source) to determine whether to accept the 
premise of the message. When motivation and ability to think are high, people 
generate more positive thoughts when they are in a positive rather than a 
neutral mood (Petty, Schumann, Richman, and Strathman, 1993), and when 
the message is presented by a source of high rather than low credibility 
(Chaiken and Maheswaran, 1994). Thus the systematic processing that 
legislators (and banks) assume to be the only type of paradigm people use in 
understanding the UCCLIO’s message is often biased by: 
1. Source factors, i.e., credibility of the sources (people tend to trust 
experts or legitimised sources). When the Managing Director of a bank, 
who is perceived to be an expert in financial matters, announces that the 
consumer has the capacity to meet her financial obligations and offers 
her a pre-approved form, the consumer is likely to accept that every 
doubt or barrier has been automatically removed by the trust in the expert 
source. As discussed in the previous section, this reference to trusted 
and expert sources is an integral component of the UCCLIO (see, for 
example, Figure 1.2 [Head of Customer Services], 4.4 [Managing 
Director, Card Solutions], and 3.2 [General Manager, Consumer and 
Commercial Cards]) 
2. Contextual factors, i.e., perceived audience evaluation of the message. 
The more a consumer perceives others have accepted the offer, the 
more they are likely to accept the persuasive message contained within 
the offer.
3. Emotional factors, i.e., emotions can influence evaluative judgments by 
affecting the confidence people have in their thoughts to a persuasive 
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message. De Steno et al. (2004, p. 43) argue that “attempts at 
persuasion would be more successful when messages were framed with 
emotional overtones matching the emotional state of the receiver and 
that these changes would be mediated by emotion-induced biases 
involving expectations attached to arguments contained in the 
messages”. That being so, UCCLIOs that contain statements such as 
“greater financial freedom” (Figure 3.4), and “special invitation” (Figure 
5.1) will engage an emotional response from the customer, particularly 
those who lack knowledge about the message topic or who must process 
under severe time constraints or other forms of stress, e.g. financial or 
personal. 
4. “Pre-approved” implies psychological ownership and property 
rights
The UCCLIO’s marketing is fundamentally based on an “endowing” action, 
i.e., because the credit increase offer is unsolicited and pre-approved, the 
customer takes immediate psychological ownership of it. Thus, the pre-
approval of the credit increase is a bank initiative, which would be interpreted 
by the customer as a “gift” that is given to its more “deserving” customers, 
often “in recognition of their excellent repayment record” (Figure 5.1). 
In addition, customers are encouraged to feel that they already “own” the 
credit increase, in that it has been pre-approved and the only thing they have 
to do is to sign a completed form, that has already had most of the key 
information completed, and to send it by mail in a pre-paid envelope. 
Everything in the UCCLIOS is “predicted” and pre-disposed in order to simplify 
the process and eliminate both material (e.g., filling out the form, sending it by 
mail) and immaterial (e.g., psychological, comprehension) barriers. Every 
element of the offer aims to reduce the customers’ role to a minimum (as 
stated in Figure 3.1, “all you have to do is to sign the form”). Although Figure 
4.5 does not fall under our definition of a UCCLIO, it is worth noting here, in 
that it follows a different and more appropriate format, by removing the 
endowment effect, to some degree, by not implying initial ownership of the 
credit limit. This is done by using the statement, “We will process your 
application and if approved…”  
Generally, then, the UCCLIO letter is framed as a choice involving a loss (if 
the customer doesn’t accept, he will lose the privilege the bank has conceded 
to him through the pre-approval) and not as a gain. As Tversky and 
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Kahneman (1981) have demonstrated, individuals are more likely to be risk-
taking for choices involving losses rather than gains. Evidence suggests that 
people innately tend to develop feelings of psychological ownership for a 
variety of objects as a consequence of their innate motive to control things 
(Furby, 1991). Furthermore, individuals naturally tend to be loss averse 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1984), and to make attempts to maintain the “status 
quo” (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988), in that giving up something they 
have already received or taken possession of, implies a loss that is greater 
than the gain associated with receiving it (Thaler, 1980). Possession does not 
need to be physical, as emotional and psychological possession can 
sometimes have a stronger influence over behaviour than physical or material 
possession. This phenomenon labeled as the “endowment effect” (Thaler, 
1980) has been demonstrated by several experiments.  
In a seminal study, Khaneman, Knetch, and Thaler (1990), examined the 
nature of endowment through an experiment conducted at Cornell University. 
Students were divided in two groups, the “choosers” and the “sellers”. The 
sellers received an object (a decorated mug valued at $5) and were asked to 
choose between two options: either selling the mug at a price ranging from 50 
cents to $9.50, or keeping the mug and taking possession of it. The 
“choosers” (who didn’t receive the mug), were asked to choose between 
receiving either a mug or a sum of money. Thus, both choosers and sellers 
had to face the same kind of issue, with the only difference being that the first 
group had to face a positive choice i.e., they didn’t have anything (the mug) to 
loose; while the sellers perceived one of the options (giving up the mug) as 
negative i.e., a loss. The results from this experiment suggested that an 
endowment effect is automatically and instantaneously produced “by giving an 
individual property rights over a consumption good” (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1991). Another fundamental result of these experiments is that “changes that 
make things worse (losses) loom larger than improvements or gains”, i.e., 
individuals are naturally loss averse (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984) in that 
they perceive “the disutility of giving up an object” as “greater than the utility 
associated with acquiring it” (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1991, p.160). 
These experiments demonstrate that, in the case of the UCCLIO, an 
endowment effect is produced as soon as individuals are advised that they 
have received the credit increase (through the UCCLIO letter) and that 
surrendering (or losing) what they have just received is made more difficult 
than it would be if they thought of it as a gain. Thus, it can be argued that the 
UCCLIO, consisting of a giving action (the customer is given a credit increase) 
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influences the consumer because it produces a perception of loss that is 
related to the missed acceptance of the offer. 
5. UCCLIOs are “loss-framed”  
Evidence suggests that people are influenced by the way a message is 
presented or “framed” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Individuals naturally 
tend to avoid an outcome that they perceive will result in a loss, because they 
are loss averse (Khaneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1991). Specifically, the 
UCCLIO’s message is presented according to a loss frame i.e., it is described 
as a unique and scarce opportunity, and something not to be missed. 
Moreover, the UCCLIO is framed in a way that presents it as a privilege; 
something special whose missed acceptance would be a loss for them 
because of the ease to obtain it (it is pre-approved), and of its scarcity. Both  
these factors increase the perception of loss if the offer is not accepted. 
Evidence suggests that loss frames may have greater impact on decisions 
than comparable gain frames (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1991). 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) demonstrated that when decision options are 
negatively phrased in terms of losses, most people are willing to take a risk to 
avoid that loss, while when options are phrased positively in terms of gain, 
people are risk averse. This phenomenon labeled as “framing effect” has been 
well-established in both the economics and psychological disciplines. For 
example, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) demonstrated that when making a 
decision individuals are influenced by the way the problem is formulated. They 
demonstrated that the same problem framed in different ways can produce 
different outcomes. This was demonstrated when 152 students from Stanford 
University were presented with a decision problem. The problem concerned 
the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease in the USA. Students were asked to 
choose between two different programs to combat the disease, considering 
that if program A was adopted 200 people would have been saved whereas if 
program B was adopted there was 1/3 probability that 600 people would have 
been saved and 2/3 probability that no one would be saved. Seventy-two 
percent of respondents chose the option framed as the riskless - that is 
Program A. 
In the second experiments another group of respondents (155) was asked to 
choose between different formulations of the problem: if program C is adopted 
400 people will die and if program D is adopted there is 1/3 of probability that 
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nobody will die and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die. In this case 78 per 
cent of participants chose the risky option: “the certain death of 400 people is 
less acceptable than the two-in-three chance that 600 people will die” 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, p.453).
In the context of UCCLIOs, we can see how framing will affect consumers’ 
decisions. In Figure 4.5, for example, the offer is framed as an “opportunity” 
and something to “take advantage” of. It is implicit in this approach that not 
accepting the offer would mean losing the privilege of having the credit 
increase. In Figure 4.4, the credit increase is described in the context of the 
customer being able to take advantage of a “bargain”, and a unique 
opportunity that “could help you get it a whole lot sooner”, and to get 
“something you’ve been really wanting to buy”. In the way that this letter is 
framed, not accepting this offer will result in a large degree of dissonance, and 
plays upon the emotional vulnerability of the customer through the leveraging 
of their consumption desires.  
In Figure 1.2, the offer is described as a solution against the unpredictability of 
life, “you never quite know when you may want access to extra credit”, and as 
a unique opportunity, “a higher credit limit can give you greater financial 
freedom”. This implies that a missed acceptance of the offer will result in the 
customer not having the appropriate tools to face the unpredictability of life, 
and without the safety or freedom to control any additional expenses. In 
addition, this framing invokes a potent psychological expectation of potential 
regret if the offer is not accepted and the customer is faced with a future 
emergency or opportunity. This, combined with the trust in the institution, 
provides a very positive framing effect, and ensures that the new status quo of 
the provided credit amount would be perceived as a loss if the customer did 
not accept the offer. 
6. Preapproval leads to “status quo” 
In the context of an UCCLIO, customers are brought to perceive and interpret 
the credit increase as a new status quo. Statements such as, “You’re already 
pre-approved” (e.g., Figure 3.2) emphasise a new advantageous situation 
they can be made real, simply by signing a form. The pre-approval aims to 
persuade customers that the process has been started and that its completion 
simply depends upon the customer’s signature. The effect of pre-approval and 
examples of this in the UCCLIO is covered substantially in section 4. 
However, what is important here is that in addition to psychological ownership 
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and property rights, the pre-approval creates a perceived status quo, 
effectively preventing the consumer from rejecting the offer. 
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) have demonstrated that the “status quo 
bias” occurs as a consequence of loss aversion. According to the authors, 
individuals have a strong tendency to maintain the status quo “because the 
disadvantages of leaving it, loom larger than advantages” (Kahneman, 
Knetsch and Thaler, 1991, p.197). Therefore, it can be argued that individuals, 
that are naturally averse for losses, would perceive that a rejection of the 
[already approved] credit increase as a loss and would seek to maintain the 
status quo, i.e., the privilege they have received. 
There is substantial evidence of the status quo effect in the psychological 
research literature. In one experiment (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988), a 
first group of participants were given a hypothetical scenario and a choice task 
without a “status quo” option. This group was asked to consider different 
portfolios in which to invest (a moderate-risk company, a high-risk company, 
treasury bills, municipal bonds) after receiving a big inheritance from their 
great-uncle. A second group was presented with the same problem, but in 
their task one of the options was designated as the “status quo” (“A significant 
portion of the portfolio is invested in a moderate-risk company”). Results 
demonstrated that the options designated as “status quo” became significantly 
more popular and that the more the options, the bigger the probability that 
participants selected the “status quo” option. 
Other experiments on the status quo bias were conducted by Hartman, Doane 
and Woo (1991) through a survey of California electricity consumers. 
Participants were divided in two groups (high and low reliability) and were 
asked to choose among six combinations of service reliabilities and rates. One 
of these options was designated as the status quo bias. Both results showed a 
statistically significant status quo effect in that both the 60 percent of the first 
group and the 58 percent of the second group selected the status quo option 
as their first choice. 
From this, it can be argued that the unsolicited credit card increase implies a 
clear “endowment effect” (Thaler, 1980), in that people instantaneously take a 
psychological ownership of what they have been given (the pre-approval of 
the credit increase), believe that this is now the status quo, and perceive that 
giving it up would be a loss.
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Furthermore, they are loss averse (Khaneman, Knetch and Thaler, 1990) and 
tend to preserve the status quo, (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) rather 
than lose the privilege (the credit increase) they have gained. 
7. Scarcity increases perceived utility 
UCCLIO’s marketing is also based upon the limited availability of the credit 
increase. In actuality, the credit increase is perceived as a “limited or scarce 
privilege” in that the provider implies that not all customers are entitled to this 
credit increase, and that only a selected number of customers are offered it. In 
Figure 4.4, for example, the offer is limited both in time – in that there is a 
clear deadline for return of the letter – and in accessibility - in that only a few 
(Coles Myer Source Mastercard holders) and reliable (“with a good credit 
history”) customers are offered the increase. 
Thus, a scarcity effect, concerning time (the offer has a clear deadline) and 
the privilege (only a certain number of customers have been offered the credit 
increase) is created. Scarcity has the power to increase the perceived value or 
utility of a good, to generate pressure, as customers are given a short amount 
of time to make a decision, and to construct a vivid representation in the mind 
of the consumer of future usage, by anticipating pleasure (Lowenstein, 1987).  
The scarcity heuristic (Brannon and Brock, 2001) suggests that people 
judge rare products to be of high value or quality. Scarcity is considered to 
be a cue to value, such that people uncritically apply an implicit rule, “what 
is rare is good” (Cialdini, 1993; Lynn, 1992) or “what is scarce is extreme” 
(Ditto and Jemmott, 1989).
Cialdini (1993) uses terms such as “automatic influence,” “click-whir 
responding,” and “brain clouding arousal” to characterise the knee-jerk 
irrational responsiveness of people to scarcity information. Cialdini (1987) 
also suggested that the scarcity heuristic is often used by marketers to 
increase utilility, e.g., through the use of “limited edition” labels. The scarcity 
heuristic is related to commodity theory (Brock, 1968), which suggests that 
“any commodity will be valued to the extent that it is unavailable” (Brock, 
1968, p. 246).
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Discussion
There should be no doubt that banks and credit providers use psychological 
manipulations to create an environment where certain customers are 
convinced, often against their better interests, to accept an unsolicited credit 
card limit-increase offer. For banks and credit card providers to argue that 
they are not using these manipulations would be disingenuous to both their 
customers and their shareholders. It is the responsibility of public companies 
to use all means available to them to ensure the most profit. Not using the 
psychological manipulations available to them would be tantamount to not 
fulfilling their role as a profit-making corporation. 
There should also be no doubt that banks and credit providers conduct 
substantial marketing research to understand which psychological 
manipulations have the most effect on consumer take-up of credit. The range 
of research tools available to examine motives to consume and barriers to 
consumption, including advanced statistical modelling and psychological 
experiments, are an integral part of the finance marketing industry. Indeed, 
marketing strategies are in themselves valuable research tools, as credit 
providers are able to assess how effective these offers are, based on 
consumer response. Again, it would be ludicrous for banks and credit 
providers to argue that they don’t use marketing researchers skilled in 
individual and social psychology to help them to design marketing campaigns.  
Further, these findings show that many of the “warnings” provided by the 
banks and financial institutions, are not sufficient to provide a “natural break” 
(Anderson 2005, p. 3), as other factors, including trust in the institution, and 
the use of heuristics, will take precedence in decision making. Similarly, other 
disclosure will have little or no effect on decisions regarding a UCCLIO, as a 
trust relationship has already been established between the customer and the 
financial provider, and the customer will use heuristics, amongst other things, 
to decide whether to accept12 the offer. 
Therefore, this report does not seek to argue that banks and credit providers 
are using psychological manipulations to persuade, encourage, or convince 
their current customers to take up a credit card limit increase. This is a given – 
they do. To move the discussion around consumer policy in relation to the 
UCCLIO forward, we must accept that banks, credit unions and other credit 
                                                           
12 Note that in the context of UCCLIOs, the customer “accepts” the offer, rather than applies 
for the increase.
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card lenders do “marketing”. However, there are difficulties inherent in 
assuming that corporations will voluntarily behave in a way that is socially 
responsible.  
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is defined by Carroll (1991, p.43) as 
the firms’ ability “to make a profit, obey the law, be ethical, and be a good 
corporate citizen”. In addition, the general concept of corporate responsibility 
can be considered as the sum of economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic 
responsibilities at a micro level.
However, in the context of profit-making organisations, it is questionable 
whether the concept of corporate social responsibility is appropriate 
(Friedman, 1970; Velasquez, 1983). Friedman (1970), for example, underlines 
the “analytical looseness and lack of rigor” of discussions concerning the 
social responsibilities of businesses and points out that the term CSR is a 
conceptual contradiction. In fact, he states, only “people can have 
responsibilities, but business as a whole cannot be said to have 
responsibilities” in that they are artificial persons.  
Friedman (1970) also states that, even if a corporation is made up of persons, 
each of whom have voluntarily assumed responsibilities – “to his family, his 
conscience, his feelings of charity, his church, his clubs, his city, his country” – 
people working for a corporation have no social responsibilities but “social 
responsibilities of individuals, not of business”. Recent CSR initiatives in 
banks have been led by individuals within the banks (the most successful of 
these being championed by CEO or another high-level executive) rather than 
by an overarching shift in the culture of corporations. 
Indeed, Friedman (1970) points out that there is a conflict of interest between 
corporations and society that makes it impossible for business to be socially 
responsible. For example, he states, that a member of a corporation should 
never act against the interests of the corporation and of his employers, such 
as refraining “from increasing the price of the product in order to contribute to 
the social objective of preventing inflation” or “hiring ‘hardcore’ unemployed, 
instead of better qualified available workmen to contribute to the social 
objective of reducing poverty”. 
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Moon et al. (2003) also argue that corporations and organisations have been 
usually described by metaphors e.g., organisation as a machine (e.g., Weber, 
Taylor) and as an organism (e.g., Spencer, Parsons). According to Morgan 
(1980), one of the new metaphors for corporations is the political system (e.g., 
citizen), used to draw attention to conflicts of interest and the role of power in 
organisations (e.g., Crozier, 1964). Wood and Logsdon (2001) question the 
appropriateness of the term “citizenship” for corporations in that “they are 
manifestly not bearers of the political rights that are characteristically seen as 
fundamental to liberal citizenship”. They argue that corporations cannot be 
“citizens”, nor behave like “citizens”, because they represent interests 
transcending “aggregates of individual citizens (e.g., the environment, 
religious norms, rights claims)”.
Indeed, corporate social responsibility is most often used as a marketing and 
branding tool, rather than a means by which a corporation can act responsibily 
solely for the good of the citizenry. Arguments for CSR in corporations are 
required to be presented in an economic context, rather than purely a social 
context. It is therefore difficult to rely solely on corporations to voluntarily 
behave in a way that may be against their corporate interests. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
This research report sought to examine a specific and discrete component of 
credit marketing – the Unsolicited Credit Card Limit Increase Offer (UCCLIO), 
through a content analysis of a selection of UCCLIO letters, using existing 
research into human decision-making as the foundation for the inquiry. 
The past few decades of psychology and consumer research have witnessed 
a move away from the view that judgments are the product of a rational, 
logical decision making process, to a view of the individual as a user of 
heuristics and shortcuts (e.g., Dawes, 1976), who makes judgments and 
decisions based on “scant data, which are seemingly haphazardly combined 
and influenced by preconceptions (Taylor 1982, p. 190).”  
In the field of social psychology, it has been found that certain elements in the 
social environment can bias the judgment process. A person who is brightly lit, 
moving, and contrasting (through the use of seemingly trivial manipulations as 
small splashes of colour on a shirt) has been found to draw a disproportionate 
amount of attention (McArthur and Post, 1977; Fiske et al., 1979). Further, 
Kahneman and Tversky (1973) observed that the use of heuristics or 
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shortcuts were likely strategies for making non-social judgments, as well as 
social ones. 
As discussed earlier, consumer regulation relies on a belief in rational 
consumers, who consider the pros and cons of a particular choice, and, after 
weighing up their options, choose the product that provides the most utility. 
Through its focus on better information disclosure, consumer regulation 
implies that, for the most part, this process is carried out in the conscious 
mind.
However, the notion that increased disclosure will alleviate any issues around 
psychological manipulations (Australian Government Productivity Commission 
2007) can be argued to be a somewhat erroneous if we accept that 
consumers will, invariably, use shortcuts and heuristics in decision making, 
particularly when they face large amounts of unfamiliar information (Fine 
2007). This makes it more important to involve consumers in the decision-
making process when it comes to credit marketing. This may incorporate 
increased financial literacy, but we argue that financial literacy and disclosure 
alone will not overcome the natural tendency of the individual to use shortcuts, 
cues and heuristics when making decisions in a context which has been 
demonstrated to already be low involvement, and is increased through the 
format of the UCCLIO. 
The use of colour, text changes, and images in the UCCLIOs in this study may 
influence a consumer’s ability to rationally consider whether the increase is 
appropriate for them (Fiske et al. 1979). While it may be reasonable to use 
these manipulations in the context of the marketing of goods and services, 
they were also used in these UCCLIOs for “important information” and product 
disclosure. This information was consistently of a smaller font, hidden within 
the form, or couched in positive terms of the benefits of credit.
At best, we can assume that the financial providers are misguided in their use 
of the warnings; at worst, the assumption would have to be that they are being 
disingenuous to their customers, and, more importantly to legislators.  
Finally, the use of the UCCLIO may also be tempting to consumers because 
the initial offer urges the consumer to increase their “limit” (not their “debt”), so 
although the consumer may choose not to use the credit, the offer avoids 
highlighting that debt is the result of increasing the limit. 
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This report does not seek to remove the responsibility of consumers to be 
aware of the nature of credit, or the pitfalls associated with increasing credit. 
Nor do we dispute that the banks and finance have certain responsibilities to 
shareholders, and therefore will use psychological manipulations in an effort to 
increase market share or profits. We do argue, however, that some 
consumers are more vulnerable to marketing efforts than others, and, 
therefore legislation needs to at least consider the psychological 
manipulations contained with credit products such as UCCLIOs. 
The following recommendations are based on the discrete and focused 
analysis conducted in this report. We do not seek to reference any current 
debate between credit providers and consumer associations, as we believe 
that the rigour of this report needs to be maintained and focused on the 
psychological issues raised in the analysis, and theoretical review. 
1. The key issue in relation to the UCCLIO, is that it is currently 
presented as a marketing and promotional letter, rather than an 
application for an increase in credit (or debt). We argue that 
involvement must be increased in the cognitive processing of the 
offer, so that the customer is approaching the application in the 
same way that they would approach a credit card application. In this 
context, we recommend that the UCCLIO offer be presented in 
the same format as a credit card application.  
2. Further, we recommend that the UCCLIO form should require 
the customer, rather than the bank, to nominate a desired credit 
limit. In this context, the credit provider will have an upper limit that 
they would consider offering to the customer, but this should not be 
disclosed on the form, but taken into account in the approval 
process. To some degree, this means that the credit provider is 
taking some responsibility for the credit increase, based on the data 
provided by the customer, and their assessment of the customer’s 
capacity to repay the increased debt. Requiring the customer to 
nominate the increase amount will mean that the consumer will 
consider the application in the same way that they will consider any 
other credit application, and be more psychologically involved in 
deciding how much credit they can afford. By forcing the customer to 
make the decision about how much credit they want, rather than 
“endowing” them with a predetermined amount, thus making the 
refusal of the offer a loss, the customer is more likely to make a 
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better judgement about their capacity to repay, and the credit 
amount they consider appropriate. We note that the Australian 
Bankers Association argues that the offer “must be followed by a 
series of other actions and decisions by the customer (Gilbert 2006, 
p.5)”.
1. A psychological and temporal “break” should be implemented in the 
presentation of the UCCLIO. The rationale behind this is to force the 
customer to engage in their decision about the increase beyond simply 
accepting it. At a minimum, we recommend that the UCCLIO 
application require the consumer to provide up-to-date income and 
expenditure details, including, but not limited to, providing pay 
slips or proof of current income. 
2. We further recommend that in calculating their current income and 
expenditure, the customer is required to include their current 
outstanding debt in their expenditure. This process will oblige the 
customer to think more thoroughly and methodically about their financial 
situation, and will slow down the application activity while the customer 
puts together the materials for the application.  
3. “Warnings” and disclosure should be presented in the same 
format, and on the same page, as the offer. In addition, customers 
should be required to sign a secondary section of the application 
that states they have read and understood the warnings and 
disclosure and that this signature should follow the warnings and 
disclosure section. Again, this serves as a psychological break in the 
process, by forcing the customer to be more cognitively involved in the 
decision. Although we recognise that some customers may simply sign 
the form, we argue that by having a secondary signature section, which 
follows the warnings and disclosure, this will have an increased effect 
on customer involvement and honesty (Mazar and Ariely 2006). 
4. The UCCLIO should include the customer’s current outstanding 
repayment amount, the minimum monthly payment for the current 
outstanding amount, and the length of time it will take to repay the 
current debt based on the minimum monthly repayment amount.
This will serve as an “anchor” for the customer to decide whether they 
are capable of repaying the current outstanding debt, in the context of 
increasing their debt.
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We recognise that implementing these recommendations will not completely 
remove the possibility of consumers making poor decisions about their 
finances. However, they are likely to result in the customer becoming more 
psychologically involved in the decision-making process. 
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3. Responding to the report findings 
As outlined in the report background, a major driver for this research was a 
concern that credit marketing was contributing to consumers’ debt stress.  The 
findings of the research report are relevant to a range of bodies that wish to 
respond to concerns arising from debt stress, including Government, 
regulators, industry and those involved in financial and consumer education. 
The extent to which credit cards contribute to debt stress is unclear.  
Anecdotally, consumer agencies and others have raised concerns about 
consumers obtaining credit limits that they can’t afford.13 These problems can 
take some time to emerge, as the required repayments on credit card debt are 
relatively low.14 This means that consumers can hold a higher level of credit 
card debt than other debt without evident hardship. 
Overall, defaults on credit cards are relatively low,15 although the figure would 
be significantly higher if it was based on the 32%16 of borrowers who pay 
interest, and excluded those who paid the total balance each month.   Many 
consumers use personal loans or mortgage credit to refinance credit card 
debt.  While there are no detailed figures available on refinancing of credit 
cards, refinancing can shift credit card problems to other credit products. 
Industry has argued that we shouldn’t be concerned about pre-approved credit 
limit increases because the default level for those accepting such an increase 
is lower than for all credit card borrowers.17  However, it would be expected 
                                                           
13 For example, “Anglicare Western are seeing growing numbers of consumers who, having 
established a revolving line of credit at an affordable level, are offered limit increases. These 
increases are often outside their capacity to repay given their existing income and debt 
levels. We are of the opinion that these increases are not sound in nature nor conscionable.”  
From Anglicare submission to the Victorian Credit Review.
14 Often only 2% of the balance outstanding each month.
15 The most recent figure available is 0.6% between 90 and 180 days overdue for all major 
bank credit cards for year ending April 2001, Credit Cards in Australia, Nolan Norton Institute 
(KPMG) Commissioned by Visa International
16 ibid   32% had not repaid their balance in full over the previous 12 months.
17 Ibid    A sample from major banks showed 0.3% of these borrowers were 90 days in 
default after 6 months and 0.5% were 90 days in default after 15 months.   
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that these consumers, who have been specifically targeted for an offer, would 
have a lower default rate at least in the short term. 
In any case, while the full impact of credit card debt on the level of debt stress 
is unknown, it is likely to be much higher than indicated by credit card default 
rates.
The research shows that UCCLIOs are designed to drive some consumers to 
take on more credit - credit that would not have been considered without such 
an offer.  The industry does not seem to doubt that this form of marketing 
leads to increased credit card spending, but argues that this is good for the 
economy.
However, an increase in the use of credit, that is generally not used to acquire 
assets or build personal wealth, is unlikely to improve the financial wellbeing 
of the individual, particularly if, as industry has suggested, many consumers 
would not access this credit without receiving a pre-approved increase.  Some 
of these consumers will become financially overcommitted. 
Unsolicited “pre-approved” credit
The two key features of UCCLIOs identified in the research as likely to affect 
consumer behaviour were the fact that they were “pre-approved” and 
unsolicited18.
While unsolicited “pre-approved” credit is mostly marketed in the form of 
credit-limit increases, it has also been used for marketing personal loans19 and
overdrafts.20
 We see little difference in the consumer impact from receiving an unsolicited 
credit card (which is prohibited by the TPA) and receiving an unsolicited pre-
approved credit-limit increase.  Limit increases require the consumer to return 
a signed form, or to click acceptance on a website, but the research report 
shows that these responses are unlikely to adequately engage the consumer 
in the credit decision.
                                                           
18 Pre-approved credit is not always unsolicited. For example credit is often pre-approved to 
a certain amount before the consumer buys a house or car.  
19 We understand that one major bank ran a trial of unsolicited pre-approved personal loans.
20 For example, the Commonwealth Bank is currently offering pre-approved overdrafts to 
some customers via email.
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We believe that a ban on the use of unsolicited, pre-approved credit as a 
marketing strategy should be considered. Prohibiting unsolicited, pre-
approved credit would not prohibit any particular credit product.  Consumers 
could still apply for a credit card or for a credit-limit increase.  The key 
difference would be that the consumer would choose to make the application, 
and would be more likely to think through the decision, as many of the 
psychological techniques identified in relation to UCCLIOs would not be 
present.
Written notices and warnings
One industry response to concerns raised about UCCLIOs is to include a 
statement, or warning, in the UCCLIO.  However, research shows that, these 
warnings are often toned down, and may indeed contain positive information 
about the offer. 
Such warnings have little, or no, impact on consumers but simply provide an 
excuse by industry to take no effective action to minimise the chance of 
consumers accepting an UCCLIO when it is not in their best interests to do so. 
Further research is needed on whether there are any benefits from providing 
this information.
Responses that impact on behaviour
Lenders are designing their marketing of UCCLIOs to influence consumer 
behaviour. In the light of this, Government, regulators and educators must 
also consider new strategies that can equally influence consumer behaviour – 
rather than rely solely on older strategies that focus purely on educating and 
informing consumers.  It may be that prohibiting, or restricting, UCCLIOs is the 
only effective way to relieve the impact of this form of marketing. 
We support the researchers’ recommendations for strategies to interrupt the 
psychologically manipulative processes involved in UCCLIOs as this would  
increase the chances of consumers considering whether to accept an 
UCCLIO.
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Applying the Findings 
We believe that: 
• Prohibition of the use of unsolicited, pre-approved credit as a marketing 
strategy should be considered. 
If this marketing is not prohibited, Consumer Action: 
• recommends that the psychological impact of UCCLIOS be taken into 
account in responses to problems caused by UCCLIOS, including 
regulatory, education and dispute resolution; and 
• supports the researchers’ recommendations to increase consumer 
involvement in decisions in relation to UCCLIOS. 
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